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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 20-2947
_____________
RONAK KUMAR PATEL,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_____________
On Petition for Review of a
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(A205-704-818)
Immigration Judge: Alberto J. Riefkohl
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit. L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 27, 2021
______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, AND ROBRENO,* District
Judge
(Opinion Filed: September 10, 2021)

*

Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, District Judge, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

______________
OPINION*
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Ronak Kumar Patel petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal and affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny Patel’s
petition for review.
I.

Background
Patel is a citizen of India and is a Hindu. He fell in love with Karishma Mir, a

Muslim woman. Their respective families did not approve of the relationship.
Nevertheless, Mir and Patel continued their relationship for nine to ten months.
In August 2012, Mir’s brother and others resorted to violence in an effort to force
Patel to end his relationship with Mir. On two separate occasions, Mir’s brother
physically attacked Patel at his workplace. During the first attack, Mir’s brother and
others punched and kicked Patel until his employer and other shopkeepers intervened.
The attackers threatened to kill Patel if he continued his relationship with Mir. Patel’s
parents took him to the hospital after the attack.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
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Twenty days after the first attack, Mir’s brother and his associates returned to
Patel’s workplace. Mir’s brother attacked Patel with a hockey stick and his associates
beat Patel. One attacker cut Patel with a knife under his eyes. Mir’s brother threatened
to kill Patel. After the attack, Patel sought medical attention and required stitches on his
face and left hand. Patel was hospitalized for three days and then spent fifteen days on
bed rest.
Friends and family counseled Patel to leave India. Fearing for his life, Patel fled
India and made his way to the United States via Central America. Patel entered the
United States on December 31, 2012, and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
commenced removal proceedings against him on the same day by serving him with a
Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as
an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Patel conceded
his removability1 and submitted an application for (1) asylum, (2) withholding of
removal, and (3) protection under the CAT.
In a written decision, the IJ found that Patel was credible but was nevertheless
ineligible for asylum. The IJ found that the abuse Patel suffered during the two attacks
rose to the level of persecution. As a result, Patel was entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Government rebutted that
presumption “because it was reasonable for [Patel] to relocate within India.” A.R. 37.
The IJ also determined that Patel failed to establish a subjective fear of persecution that is

After Patel declined to designate a country of removal, DHS designated India as Patel’s
country of removal.
1
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objectively reasonable because there was a lack of evidence that Mir’s family was still
looking for Patel and that they were motivated to persecute him again. Additionally, the
IJ found that Patel failed to “demonstrate a ‘pattern or practice’ of persecution of
individuals in interfaith relationships that the government is unable or unwilling to
control.” A.R. 37 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)). Because Patel failed to
meet his burden of proof for his asylum claim, he necessarily failed to meet the higher
standard for withholding of removal.
Turning to Patel’s claim for relief under the CAT, the IJ found that Patel had not
shown that “it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return to India.”
A.R. 39. Specifically, the IJ concluded that Patel’s CAT claim required the IJ “to string
together a series of suppositions[,]” which Patel had not shown are more likely than not
to occur. Id. Based on a lack of evidence, the IJ rejected Patel’s claim that the Indian
government would consent or acquiesce to his torture because of Mir’s father’s alleged
influence and connection with members of the government. The IJ denied each of Patel’s
claims for relief and ordered him removed to India based on the charges in the Notice to
Appear.
Patel timely appealed the IJ’s order to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal. The
BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that DHS had rebutted the presumption that Patel has
a well-founded fear of persecution and, as a result, was not eligible for asylum. The BIA
noted that country conditions reports indicated that there were attacks on people in
interfaith relationships, but “the violence was directed at members of the Muslim minority
population, not members of the Hindu majority.” A.R. 04. The BIA also discussed Patel’s
4

lack of knowledge of Mir’s father’s connection to the government and Patel’s testimony
that he and his family had not been contacted by Mir’s family in seven years. The BIA
concluded that there was no error in the factual findings underpinning the IJ’s denial of
Patel’s claim for relief under the CAT. This timely petition for review followed.
II.

Discussion
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1). “Where, as here, ‘the BIA’s opinion directly states that the BIA is deferring
to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and factfinding in support of the
BIA’s conclusions, we review both decisions.’” Thayalan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 137
(3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2017) (some
internal quotation marks omitted)).2
We review a petitioner’s challenges to the agency’s factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard. Id. “[T]hat review is highly deferential . . . . The agency’s
‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). “[W]e uphold the IJ’s findings if they are ‘supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”

Respondents state that the BIA deferred to the IJ’s determinations that “(1) DHS
rebutted the presumption of future persecution . . . and (2) Mr. Patel failed to demonstrate
it was more likely than not he would suffer torture by or with the consent or
acquiesce[nce] of the government if returned to India . . . .” Resp’t’s Br. 15. We agree
with this assessment of the BIA’s opinion.
2
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Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665
F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Patel raises three primary challenges to the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of
his applications for asylum and withholding of removal.3 We address each in turn.
First, Patel contends that the objective prong of the test, whether he has a wellfounded fear of future persecution,4 is satisfied because “due to the extreme severity of
the[] attacks [he] has good reason to fear future persecution.” Pet’r’s Br. 8–9. We,
however, lack jurisdiction to address this argument because Patel failed to exhaust it before
the BIA. See Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 986 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A noncitizen must
exhaust h[is] claim before the BIA for this Court to have jurisdiction over the claim.”).

Patel forfeited his challenge to the BIA’s determination regarding his claim for relief
pursuant to the CAT by only referencing torture in the header to a subsection within his
brief and once in passing within the body of his brief. See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v.
CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments raised in
passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered [forfeited].”).
3

Pursuant to § 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Attorney
General may grant asylum to removable aliens if the applicant is a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a). As relevant here, the INA defines a “refugee” as:
4

[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and
who is . . . unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). “The well-found[ed] fear of persecution
standard involves both a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an objectively
reasonable possibility of persecution.” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582,
590–91 (3d Cir. 2011). Determining whether an applicant’s fear of persecution is
objectively reasonable “requires ascertaining whether a reasonable person in the alien’s
circumstances would fear persecution if returned to a given country.” Id. at 591.
6

While this Court’s exhaustion policy is “liberal,” neither Patel’s notice of appeal nor his
brief placed the BIA on notice that he was contesting the IJ’s determination that he had a
well-founded fear of future persecution based on the severity of the prior attacks. Id.
Indeed, the BIA concluded that Patel was not raising this issue. A.R. 4 n.1 (noting that
Patel did “not argue that he has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or
unable to return to India arising out of the severity of the past persecution he experienced
or that he has established a reasonable possibility that he may suffer other serious harm
upon removal to India”). Patel has not asserted that the BIA erred in reaching that
conclusion.
Second, Patel objects to the BIA’s finding that he could avoid future persecution by
relocating within India. Because Patel established past persecution, he is entitled to a
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution on the same basis as his original claim.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The Government may rebut that presumption by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) that Patel “could avoid future persecution by relocating
to another part of” India and (2) that “under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable
to expect [Patel] to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see also Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956
F.3d 135, 150 (3d Cir. 2020). Patel contends that it is not reasonable for him to relocate
within India because he does not “feel safe” doing so because of Mir’s father’s “high
position in politics” and connections within the government and law enforcement officials.
Pet’r’s Br. 11.
The BIA’s determination that Patel could relocate to another part of India is
supported by substantial evidence. Namely, the country conditions evidence before the
7

BIA and the IJ included evidence that religiously motivated attacks against individuals in
interfaith relationships was often inflicted upon Muslims, not Hindus like Patel. This
evidence supported the finding that Patel could avoid future persecution by relocating to
another part of India.
Patel argues that the BIA did not address that his attackers were “politically
influential persons with power over law enforcement and the military,” which would allow
them to locate Patel if he returned to India. Pet’r’s Br. 11. Patel’s testimony on this issue
lacked basic details regarding Mir’s father’s alleged connections and influence,
undermining a finding that Patel would be subject to persecution in other parts of India.
For example, Patel did not know what type of work Mir’s father engaged in or his position
within or in relation to the government. Patel offered no corroborating evidence to support
his conclusory assertions about Mir’s father’s prominence in the community or ability to
influence law enforcement. Patel also testified that he did not know whether Mir’s family
was looking for him, and that approximately one year after he left India, Mir’s brother
asked Patel’s parents about his location, but did not threaten Patel or his parents.
In light of the country conditions evidence, Patel’s testimony, and the lack of
evidence to corroborate Patel’s allegations regarding the influence and power of his
attackers, we cannot conclude that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find
that Patel could not relocate within India. See Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1692.
Finally, Patel contends that he is “entitled to a grant of withholding of removal
pursuant to Section 241(b)(3) of the” INA. Pet’r’s Br. 12. Because we do not disturb the
BIA’s finding that Patel failed to demonstrate his eligibility for asylum, he necessarily
8

cannot meet the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal and we will not address
the merit of his arguments on this issue. See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 544 (3d
Cir. 2018) (“[A]n alien who fails to qualify for asylum is necessarily ineligible for
withholding of removal.” (quoting Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 591)).
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will deny Patel’s petition for review.
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